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PATENT STEWARDSHIP, CHOICE OF LAW, AND WEIGHING
COMPETING INTERESTS
David O. Taylor*
Many have criticized the Federal Circuit over the years for expanding
its jurisdiction or applying its own law in inappropriate circumstances.1
Paul Gugliuzza, for example, recently argued that the Federal Circuit has
wrongly expanded its jurisdiction “to protect and enhance its power
relative to state courts,”2 and that it “has improperly leveraged choice-oflaw doctrine to expand the scope of federal common law and restrict the
scope of state contract law.”3 In this regard, Xuan-Thao Nguyen’s article,
In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit’s Overreach into
Commercial Law,4 might be seen as “piling on”—simply more detailed
evidence of overreaching by the nation’s patent court, which is troubling,
but familiar.
It is quite another thing, however, to criticize the Federal Circuit for
systematically arriving at wrong conclusions in matters of commercial law
traditionally governed by state law and state courts. This is a new critique,
and it is important for at least two potential reasons that Nguyen
highlights. First, to the extent that the Federal Circuit’s decisions related to
commercial law differ from state courts’ decisions related to commercial
law, it might call into question the Federal Circuit’s competency with
respect to commercial law.5 And, second, it certainly highlights something
that practitioners might need to know to adapt their advice and strategies
for reaching their clients’ desired ends. 6 Indeed, Nguyen makes both
claims, and not without a substantial basis in both her expertise and
analysis.7
But Nguyen’s critique is important for a third reason. Assuming the
Federal Circuit’s competency, her critique calls into question the Federal
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Thanks to Jeff Kahn for his
helpful feedback on a draft of this essay.
1. See, e.g., James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust
Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 139–47 (2001).
2. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1807 (2013).
3. Id. at 1819.
4. 67 FLA. L. REV. 127 (2015).
5. See id. at 153–54, 157 (“lack of understanding”; “weak grasp”; “fails to recognize
fundamental concepts in commercial law”; “failed to understand state law on secured transactions,
preference, and fraudulent transfer under California statutes and case law”).
6. See id. at 128–30 (describing how a commercial lawyer might be “speechless” given the
Federal Circuit’s decisions).
7. Nguyen is an expert at the intersection of commercial law and intellectual property,
having published numerous law review articles and textbooks on point. See generally, e.g., XuanThao Nguyen, Financing Innovation: Legal Development of Intellectual Property as Security in
Financing, 1845–2014, 48 IND. L. REV. 509 (2015); JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND LITIGATION ISSUES (2003). Beyond her
expertise, Nguyen’s detailed analysis comparing the Federal Circuit’s decisions with state
commercial law speaks for itself. See Nguyen, supra note 4 at 131–69.

14

Patent Stewardship, Choice of Law, and Weighing Competing Interests

[Vol. 67

Circuit’s reasoning and motivation, not only for its repeated decisions to
follow its own law rather than state commercial law, but also for its
substantive conclusions. In other words, the preliminary question is: Why
is the Federal Circuit choosing its own law rather than state commercial
law? But the next question is perhaps more important: Why does the
Federal Circuit’s law result in different outcomes when compared to state
commercial law? The Federal Circuit leaves these questions
unanswered—even unaddressed. Nguyen’s implicit accusation is that there
is no good reason for the Federal Circuit to choose its own law,
particularly when it leads to a different result.
With regard to the preliminary question, it is important to note that two
of the three decisions she highlights resolved jurisdictional challenges on
grounds of lack of constitutional standing by plaintiffs.8 In these two cases
the Federal Circuit was not merely deciding questions of commercial law.
In the first case, for example, it was not just deciding a question of state
contract law governing sales and purchases of assets. Nor was the Federal
Circuit, in the second case, just deciding a question of state law governing
liquidating trusts. No, in these two cases the court was addressing these
issues as predicates to the ultimate question of constitutional standing;
they were subsidiary issues. To be precise, in the first case the subsidiary
issue was exactly when the plaintiff acquired legal title to the patent-insuit, where this issue needed to be addressed for purposes of a
constitutional standing analysis.9 And in the second case, the subsidiary
issue was whether the plaintiff suffered injury in fact, where this issue
likewise needed to be addressed to determine constitutional standing.10
Nguyen effectively characterizes these subsidiary issues as legal
questions governed by state commercial law. That may be true. What is
missing in these two cases is any analysis of whether state contract law or
Federal Circuit constitutional standing law should apply in these
circumstances to resolve these underlying issues. The Federal Circuit
simply applied its precedent on the matter of constitutional standing. An
actual analysis of choice of law would have to confront critical doctrines
that state courts do not confront when they decide only the underlying
questions of commercial law: supremacy, federalism, and uniformity. It is
these doctrines that the Federal Circuit fails to engage. Which doctrine
8. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
(reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional standing); Morrow v.
Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Since GUCLT fails to meet constitutional
standing requirements, it cannot be a party to this suit for patent infringement.”).
9. Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1366–68 (“Even if the November 12, 2007 agreement is
considered to be a nunc pro tunc assignment, for purposes of standing, Abraxis was required to
have legal title to the patents on the day it filed the complaint and that requirement can not be met
retroactively.”).
10. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1339 n.5 (noting the court would “only discuss injury in fact, which
is dispositive of this case”).
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should trump the other? Traditional notions of the supremacy of federal
law might indicate that the Federal Circuit’s standing law should prevail.
Traditional notions of federalism might indicate that state commercial law
should prevail. And uniformity is a doctrine that the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly cited as a reason for it to apply its own law in patent cases.11
For her part, Nguyen focuses on federalism, but she does not address
competing concerns with supremacy and uniformity.12 Confronting these
doctrines would require consideration of whether constitutional standing
in any particular case should turn on the applicable state commercial law,
and whether this would create any (or too much) uncertainty. These
doctrines might explain the Federal Circuit’s decision to apply its own
law.
With regard to the second question, what Nguyen has identified—other
than potential incompetency, teaching moments for practicing attorneys,
and a missing choice-of-law analysis—is a potential tension between the
policies underlying the Federal Circuit’s constitutional standing law and
the policies underlying state commercial law. In short, what is particularly
troubling is that the Federal Circuit has not explained why, when it applies
its own law of constitutional standing, it reaches conclusions that do not
appear to coincide with state commercial law and, moreover, why that is
okay. It is apparent that Nguyen finds the policies underlying state
commercial law—to “encourage corporate commercial transactions such
as asset transfers” and to enable a bankruptcy trustee “to pursue causes of
action for its beneficiaries, to oversee various litigation and tax matters, to
prosecute avoidance actions, or to complete distributions to unsecured
creditors”—to be particularly beneficial. 13 But she has not explicitly
addressed competing concerns underlying constitutional standing, such as
“ensuring that litigants are truly adverse and therefore likely to present the
case effectively” and “ensuring that the people most directly concerned are
able to litigate the questions at issue.”14
In sum, Nguyen has made a substantial contribution to the analysis of
the Federal Circuit’s handling of matters related to state law. Further
analysis of two issues, at least with respect to two of the three cases she
highlights, however, would be helpful: (1) choice of law given the
doctrines of supremacy and uniformity; and (2) whether the policies
underlying constitutional standing trump the policies underlying
11. See, e.g., Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 756 F.3d 1366, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Federal Circuit, rather than regional circuit, law in part because “[t]he
importance of the matters raised . . . to the continued uniform application of the patent laws is
clear”). Both Abraxis and Morrow are patent cases. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1360
(describing claims of patent infringement); Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1334–35.
12. Nguyen, supra note 4 at 166–67.
13. Id. at 134, 158.
14. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988).
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commercial law. With regard to these issues, neither the Federal Circuit
nor Nguyen have made their case. An explicit analysis of these issues by
Nguyen would no doubt redound to the great benefit of the Federal Circuit
and its bar.

